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bstract
In a sample of 686 investable firms from 26 emerging market countries, I show that equity market liberalizations do not result in an increase
n externally-financed growth rates for participating firms. In fact I find mostly to the contrary. These findings are in line with recent work which
hows that firms issue less and not more equity capital post-liberalization, and suggest the gains from equity market liberalizations may not be
ttributable to a reduction in financing constraints.
2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Africagrowth Institute.
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the use of external equity financing, but does result in increased
firm growth, as shown by Mitton (2006). Therefore, the findings
of Mitton (2006), Flavin and O’Connor (2010), and McLean
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. Introduction
The decision by countries to liberalize their equity markets
as attracted much academic attention. With some exceptions
see Rodrik, 1998), this line of inquiry has shown equity market
iberalizations in a good light. For example, at the firm-level,
quity market liberalizations serve to increase investment and
mprove operating performance (see Bae and Goyal, 2010;
itton, 2006), heighten firm visibility, improve corporate gov-
rnance (see Bae et al., 2006), and increase firm value (see
ae and Goyal, 2010; Mitton and O’Connor, 2012; O’Connor,
012). At the country-level, equity market liberalizations result
n increased investment and economic growth (see Bekaert et al.,
005, 2007, 2010).
However, the central theoretical prediction of equity mar-
et liberalizations has largely been ignored in empirical work.
quity market liberalizations refer to instances where restric-
ions on the foreign ownership of domestic equity are removed.
s a result, we should then expect to observe greater equity
ssuance, potential changes in debt issuance and shifts in debt∗ Tel.: +35317086667.
E-mail address: thomas.g.oconnor2012@nuim.ie
eer review under responsibility of Africagrowth Institute.
879-9337 © 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of
fricagrowth Institute.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.aturity structure, and eventually a relaxation in financing
onstraints, post-liberalization.1 While the literature provides
ndirect evidence to suggest this is the case (e.g. the “investable
remium” of Mitton and O’Connor (2012) and the improve-
ent in operating performance experienced by investable firms
s documented by Mitton (2006) are both consistent with a
elaxation in financing constraints), recent direct tests sug-
est this may not be so. Flavin and O’Connor (2010) and
cLean et al. (2011) examine the capital issuance activity
f investable firms. Surprisingly, neither documents a signifi-
ant increase in equity issuance once firms become investable.
lavin and O’Connor (2010) uncover no significant change in
et equity issuance. McLean et al. (2011) document a significant
ecrease.2 Together, these findings suggest if anything, equity
arket liberalizations result in a decrease, and not an increase inWhile there is no direct theoretical link between equity market liberalizations
nd corporate debt issuance, equity market liberalization may promote greater
ebt issuance e.g. greater use of long-term debt, if investors are now more willing
o invest in firms that now have foreign investors. Schmukler and Vesperoni
2006) document a shift toward short-term debt for firms after stock market
iberalizations. Flavin and O’Connor (2010) find to the contrary using a firm-
pecific (and presumably less noisy) measure of equity market liberalizations
.e. the investable measure.
2 The difference in the findings between the studies of Flavin and O’Connor
2010) and McLean et al. (2011) may be attributable to the different sample
eriods examined by each. The former examine the capital issuance behavior of
nvestable (and cross-listing) firms up to and including the year 2000. The latter
nclude all years up to and including 2008.
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firm can attain by using both internal cash-flows and short-term
debt. If we further assume a constant short-term debt to assets
ratio to ensure a feasible growth estimate for the firm, then SFGtT. O’Connor / Review of Dev
t al. (2011) suggest that investable firms grow, and they finance
his growth mainly using internal and not external funds. In this
aper, I test this proposition. That is, I examine the link between
rm growth and the contribution made by external finance to that
rowth around the time in which firms first become investable.
To do so, I begin with the constrained or predicted growth
ates of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). These meas-
res predict the maximum growth rate that a firm can achieve
iven access to internal funds and short-term external debt
nancing only (denoted as SFGt), or internal funds, short and
ong-term debt financing (denoted as SGt), respectively. With
hese predicted growth rates, I calculate the difference between
firms’ actual and predicted growth rate, since the difference is
n indirect measure of access to external financing for firms, and
s a direct measure of a firm’s externally-financed growth rate
EFG). Equity market liberalizations should result in an increase
n externally-financed growth rates for investable firms. In this
aper, I test this proposition.
To do so, I form a panel of 686 investable firms, and 2104
rms in total from 26 emerging market countries. Using a series
f firm-fixed effects regressions which span the period from
980 to 2000, I document a decrease in externally-financed
rowth rates for investable firms. My findings, together with
hose of Flavin and O’Connor (2010) and McLean et al. (2011),
uggest the relative contribution made by external financing (i.e.
ong-term debt and equity financing) vis-à-vis internal financing,
o firm growth, as documented by Mitton (2006), is less because
rms use less external financing once they become investable.
Collectively, these findings serve to better inform our under-
tanding of equity market liberalizations. First, they do not
uggest firms do not benefit from becoming investable. Ample
vidence exists to suggest otherwise. What they do suggest is
he source(s) of the gains documented in the literature does
ot result from greater risk sharing and a decline in financing
onstraints. The gains result most likely from improvements
n a firm’s information environment resulting from corporate
overnance improvements (see Bae et al., 2006). The experi-
nce of investable firms contrasts with the experience of some
rms cross-listing in the U.S. because the “cross-listing pre-
ium” is a function of, among others, improved governance (see
oidge et al., 2004, 2009; Lang et al., 2003), reduced finan-
ing constraints (see Reese and Weisbach, 2002; Lins et al.,
005; Khurana et al., 2008), and greater recognition (see King
nd Segal, 2009). Finally and as already alluded to by McLean
t al. (2011), my finding’s do suggest that investable firms
se less external finance once they become investable because
hey are likely to be mature firms with little need for external
nancing. The fact that firms continue to grow, while simultane-
usly using less external financing once they become investable,
uggests this is likely to be the case. Investability does not
educe financing constraints because investable firms are, at
east around the time of first becoming investable, unlikely to
e financially-constrained and in need of additional external
nance.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I outline
easures of externally-financed growth. Section 3 describes the
ample of firms. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical aent Finance 3 (2013) 1–12
ndings. Section 5 presents some robustness exercises, while
ection 6 concludes.
. Measures of externally ﬁnanced growth
To construct measures of externally-financed firm growth
ates, I adopt Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic’s (1998) appli-
ation of a firm-based financial planning model. This approach
as been used by, among others, Khurana et al. (2008). The fol-
owing draws heavily on Khurana et al. (2008). To construct a
rm’s externally-financed growth rate (EFG) at time t involves
wo steps. In the first step, a firm’s “constrained or predicted
rowth rates” is calculated. These growth rates represent the
aximum growth that a firm can achieve if the firm relies solely
n say, internal funds, internal funds and short-term debt, and
nternal funds and short and long-term debt financing, respec-
ively. The second step involves using these “constrained or
redicted growth rates” to calculate a firm’s externally-financed
rowth rate. Externally-financed growth represents the differ-
nce between a firm’s realized growth rate (normally measured
early using either sales or asset growth) and the firm’s “con-
trained or predicted growth rate” (Step 1). If equity market
iberalizations result in greater externally-financed growth rates
or firms, then we would expect to see an increase in the
ifference between a firm’s realized growth rates and their “con-
trained or predicted growth rate”.
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) build on the “per-
entage of sales” approach to financial planning and derive three
constrained or predicted growth rates”, which they denote as
Gt, SFGt, and SGt. IGt is the maximum growth that a firm can
chieve if it relies solely on internal funds. SFGt is the maxi-
um growth rate that a firm can attain by using both internal
ash-flows and short-term debt. SGt is the maximum growth
ate achievable using internal funds, short and long-term debt
xternal financing. I use the latter two.3
Begin with the expression for the external financing need
EFN) of a firm, which is:
FNt = [gt × Assetst] − [(1 + gt) × (Et × bt)] (1)
The external financing need of a firm at time t is the difference
etween the product of assets at time t (Assetst) times’ sales
rowth at time t (gt) and the product of earnings after interest and
axes (Et), the proportion of earnings retained for reinvestment
t time t (bt), and 1 plus sales growth at time t. A firm has
n external financing need if [gt × Assetst] > [(1 + gt) × (Et ×
t)], i.e. the required investment of a firm growth at rate gt[gt ×
ssetst] is not covered by internal funds [(1 + gt) × (Et × bt)].
sing this expression for a firm’s external financing need, we can
hen continue to derive two measures of constrained firm growth.
he first, denoted as SFGt, is the maximum growth rate that a3 For a variety of reasons, emerging market firms typically use short-term debt
s their major source of external financing (see Opazo et al., 2009).
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dummy which is 1 if the firm in deemed investable, and 0 other-
wise. I expect β1 to be positive if equity market liberalizations
result in enhanced externally-financed growth rates.T. O’Connor / Review of Dev
s obtained by setting the retention ratio (bt) in the expression
or a firm’s external financing need to 1 i.e. the firm pays no
ividend. Solving for gt, the implied growth rate (SFGt) is given
y:
SFGt = ROLTCt(1 − ROLTCt)
)
(2)
ROLTCt is the ratio of earnings after interest and taxation
EAITt) to long-term capital.4 Long-term capital is the assets of
he firm not financed using short-term debt and is calculated by
ultiplying a firm’s total assets by 1 minus the ratio of short-
erm liabilities to total assets. SFGt refers to a firm’s maximum
hort-term financed growth rate.
The second constrained growth rate denoted as SGt is the
aximum growth rate achievable using internal funds, short and
ong-term debt to maintain a constant book leverage ratio (i.e.
otal debt to assets). Further assume the following. First, the
ayout ratio remains at zero; second, the firm does not issue
quity or increase leverage beyond the realized level; and third,
he retention ratio (bt) is 1. The estimate of SGt is then estimated
y first; replacing total assets in the expression or external finan-
ing need with book equity, and second, setting Eq. (1) to zero.
olving for gt(SGt) yields:
SGt = ROEt(1 − ROEt)
)
(3)
ROEt is the return on equity. SGt is the maximum sustainable
rowth rate.
With the constrained or predicted growth rates defined, the
econd and final step involves calculating a firm’s externally-
nanced growth rate. Externally-financed growth rates (EFG)
or a firm in each year is given by the difference in the annual real-
zed sales (or asset) growth rate less the constrained or predicted
rowth rates just outlined. These measures of external-financed
rowth examine if each firm’s growth (using realized sales or
sset growth) is greater than that predicted by the maximum
hort-term financed growth rate (SFGt) or the maximum sus-
ainable growth rate (SGt). The greater the difference between
he actual and predicted growth rate, the greater is that part of
rowth externally-financed. Following Khurana et al. (2008),
denote these two externally-financed growth rates as Excess
FG and Excess SG. Both of these measures serve as dependent
ariables in our empirical setup.
The benchmark empirical setup involves regressing each
f these two measures of externally-financed growth on the
nvestable dummy (a firm specific measure of equity market
iberalizations), a set of firm-level control variables, and time
nd firm fixed effects. The firm-level controls are dividend pay-
ut (DIV/TA), firm performance (profitability (EBIT/TA) and
sset turnover (NS/NFA)), firm size (SIZE), growth opportuni-
ies (NFA/TA), and a measure of a firm’s reliance on long-term
ebt (LTD/TA). The reason for the inclusion of each is as follows.
4 I’m forced to use earnings before interest and taxation in place of earnings
fter interest and taxation expense because Worldscope coverage of interest and
axation expense for emerging market firms is limited.
t
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c
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ividend paying (DIV/TA), profitable firms (EBIT/TA), with
otable asset turnover (NS/NFA) have sizable internal funds, and
s a result, less of a reliance on external funds. Typically these
rms have low externally-financed growth rates. In contrast,
mall firms (SIZE) with sizable growth opportunities (NFA/TA),
unded using long-term debt (LTD/TA), have higher externally-
nanced growth rates.5 DIV/TA is total dividends to total assets,
rofitability is earnings before interest and taxation to total assets
EBIT/TA), and asset turnover is the ratio of net sales to net fixed
ssets (NS/NFA). I measure firm size (SIZE) as the natural log
f total assets, expressed in real U.S. dollars. Reliance on long-
erm debt is the ratio of long-term debt divided by lag total assets
LTD/TA). Finally, growth opportunities are the ratio of net fixed
ssets to total assets (NFA/TA). I source all firm-level financial
nformation from Worldscope for each year from 1980 to 2000.
exclude financial firms.
To examine the relationship between equity market liber-
lization and externally-financed growth rates, I estimate the
ollowing:
xcess SGit = β1 INVESTABLEit + β2
(
DIVit
TAit
)
+β3
(
EBITit
TAit
)
+ β4
(
NSit
NFAit
)
+β5 SIZEit + β6
(
LTDit
TAit−1
)
+β7
(
NFAit
TAit
)
+ αt + αi + εit (4a)
xcess SFGit = β1 INVESTABLEit + β2
(
DIVit
TAit
)
+β3
(
EBITit
TAit
)
+ β4
(
NSit
NFAit
)
+β5 SIZEit + β6
(
LTDit
TAit−1
)
+β7
(
NFAit
TAit
)
+ αt + αi + εit (4b)
Where as well as the variables described earlier, αt and αi are
ime and firm-fixed effects.6 INVESTABLEit is a firm-specific
easure of equity market liberalizations, that is, it is a 0/15 As pointed out by Khurana et al. (2008), growth opportunities decrease in
he ratio of net fixed assets to total assets (NFA/TA). Hence, I would expect to
nd a negative relationship between externally-financed growth and NFA/TA.
6 I find that my conclusions remain unaltered if I cluster by country or by
ountry and time (see Petersen, 2009; Thompson, 2011). The standard errors
lustered by country and country and time tend to be larger than the standard
rrors clustered by firm alone.
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cing constraints. Recent work by Flavin and O’Connor (2010)
and McLean et al. (2011) corroborate my findings. Both find that
investable firms do not issue more, and sometimes less, equityT. O’Connor / Review of Dev
. Sample description
I begin with all 2784 firms from the major markets of the
FC Emerging Market Database (EMDB) that the IFC deem
nvestable between 1980 and 2000. I measure the openness of a
rm’s stock to foreign investors using the “investable” measure
rovided by the EMDB.7 The IFC designates a firm as investable
f its stock is free from both country-level and firm-level restric-
ions on foreign investment. The IFC also require that each firm
as sufficient size and liquidity to be truly available to foreign
nvestors. I define a firm as investable in a given year if the firm’s
tock appears in the IFC investable index by December of that
ear.
I include a firm in the final sample if it has financial data
vailable in the Worldscope database and satisfies a number of
inimum-data requirements. First, I require that each investable
rm has financial data available at least one year before and one
ear after the year in which they are first deemed investable. Sec-
nd, I require that each firm that never becomes investable has
nancial data available one year either side of the median year
n which firms are first investable in their respective countries.
nce I impose these data requirements, I lose all firms from
gypt, Jordan, Morocco, Slovakia, and Zimbabwe.
I present the final sample in Table 1. It consists of 686
nvestable firms from twenty six countries. The total number
f noninvestable firms is 1418, which added to the number of
nvestable firms’ results in a final sample of 2104 firms, or 13,821
rm-year observations. Table 1 presents, by country, the number
f investable (# Inv) and noninvestable (# NI) firms, the number
f firm-year observations (# Obs), and the total number of firms
# Total). The number of firms by varies significantly, ranging
rom a minimum of 7 in Russia to a high of 298 in Malaysia.
alaysia provides the greatest number of firm-year observa-
ions with 2242, or 16.22% of the total firm-year observations.
orea (89) provides the largest number of investable firms, while
ungary provides a single investable firm. The final sample
overs the period from 1980 to 2000. The median investable
rm in my sample first becomes investable in 1990 (see column
abeled “First Invest” in Table 1). Firms from, among others,
orea (1981) and Portugal (1986) become investable much ear-
ier. Firms from the Czech Republic (1997) and Russia (1997)
ecome investable much later.
. Findings
Table 2 compares the mean and median excess growth rates
f investable firms before and after they first become investable.
xcess growth is Excess SG and Excess SFG, and I calculate
oth using either sales or asset growth. I outline these measures
n the top rows of Table 2. In the remaining rows of Table 2, I
alculate the proportion of investable firms who rely on exter-
al financing, before and after they first become investable. The
7 Amongst others, Mitton and O’Connor (2012), Flavin and O’Connor (2010),
nd McLean et al. (2011) all use the investable firm-specific measure of equity
arket liberalizations.
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roportion is the number of firms in the sample of investable
rms whose median growth rate exceeds their median SG
or SFG), divided by the number of firms in the sample.
hese summary measures suggest that neither the mean nor
edian investable firm experiences a significant change in their
xternally-financed growth rates once they become investable.
owever, I do find the proportion of investable firms who rely
n external financing falls once they become investable. Using
xcess SG, the proportion of firms who rely on external finan-
ing falls from 0.28 in the pre-investable period to 0.17 in the
ost-investable period. These univariate comparisons suggest
f anything, investable firms use less external-financing, and
xperience no significant increase in the proportion of their
rowth financed-externally once they become investable. Inter-
stingly, the proportion of soon to be investable firms using
xternal financing is low. If the proportion is low because firms
re financially constrained, and if equity market liberalizations
erve to relax these financing constraints, then I would expect
o observe an increase in externally-financed growth rates once
rms become investable. If, on the other hand, investable firms
re not financially-constrained, but mature firms with little need
or external-financing, then equity market liberalizations are
ikely to have little or no impact on their externally-financed
rowth rates. From Table 3 onwards, I explore these possibilities
urther.
Table 3 contains the coefficient estimates from estimating
qs. (4a) and (4b), with and without time fixed effects.8 I also
resent estimates of Eqs. (4a) and (4b), where I calculate the
ependent variable using asset growth (and not sales growth as
efore). Columns 1–4 contain the coefficient estimates when
xcess SG is the dependent variable. The remaining columns
5–8) use Excess SFG. The coefficient estimates suggest that
rrespective of the dependent variable employed (Excess SG
r Excess SFG), the measurement of external financed growth
using sales or asset growth), or given the inclusion or exclusion
f time fixed effects, the coefficient estimates on the investable
ummy are negative, and always statistically different from
ero.9 The coefficient estimates range from −0.047 to −0.122
hich suggest if anything, and contrary to expectations, equity
arket liberalizations result in a decrease in externally-financed
rowth rates. These findings suggest the growth effects associ-
ted with stock market liberalizations, documented by among
thers, Mitton (2006), are not the result of a relaxation in finan-
108 Khurana et al. (2008) estimate Eqs. (4a) and (4b) with firm fixed effects but
ithout time fixed effects. When I exclude time fixed effects, the coefficient
stimates tend to be much larger, and the standard errors much smaller.
9 I also estimate a series of pooled ordinary least squares estimates with coun-
ry, time, and industry fixed effects included (as Khurana et al. (2008) also
o). When I do so, I find that my conclusions are qualitatively unchanged. The
stimates are available from me upon request.
10 The analysis presented in Gupta and Yuan (2009) suggest that equity market
iberalizations do reduce financing constraints.
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Table 1
Sample description.
Sample description Key date Financial development, country disclosure, governance and
shareholder rights indicators
Investable single and
dual-class share firms
# I # NI # Total # Obs First invest DCPS MCAP ACC GOV SR Invest & SC Invest & DC
Argentina 17 8 25 180 1988 0.239 0.584 45 1.036 3 7 10
Brazil 37 48 85 567 1990 0.347 0.376 54 (0.091) 5 2 35
Chile 25 33 58 431 1992 0.635 0.800 52 6.181 5 22 3
China 28 82 110 533 1991 1.246 0.538 – (2.343) 1 1 27
Colombia 7 8 15 126 1990 0.269 0.115 50 (3.403) 4 6 1
Czech Rep. 4 13 17 62 1997 0.540 0.214 – 4.650 4 4 0
Greece 34 59 93 701 1986 – 0.990 55 4.342 3 20 14
Hungary 1 8 9 50 1993 0.322 0.258 – 5.162 2 1 0
India 49 198 247 1111 1990 0.288 0.321 57 (1.042) 4 49 0
Indonesia 31 75 106 729 1990 0.219 0.179 – (4.186) 4 5 26
Israel 10 11 21 129 1993 0.869 0.581 64 4.319 3 10 0
Korea 89 139 228 1598 1981 1.010 0.372 62 2.992 4 89 0
Malaysia 82 216 298 2242 1981 1.406 1.299 – 2.460 4 82 0
Mexico 29 29 58 456 1981 0.130 0.216 60 (0.676) 2 7 22
Pakistan 16 55 71 433 1993 0.298 0.108 – (4.889) 5 15 1
Peru 12 11 23 120 1992 0.259 0.198 38 (1.740) 4 2 10
Philippines 23 36 59 357 1991 0.444 0.689 65 (0.662) 4 17 6
Poland 13 17 30 148 1994 0.278 0.191 4.117 2 13 0
Portugal 16 19 35 291 1986 1.398 0.573 36 7.359 3 12 4
Russia 5 2 7 28 1997 0.119 0.150 – (4.151) 4 5 0
Sth Africa 28 53 81 905 1981 0.289 0.066 70 1.721 5 23 5
Sri Lanka 10 1 11 68 1994 1.389 1.602 – (2.005) 4 10 0
Taiwan 58 110 168 897 1989 – – 65 5.291 5 57 1
Thailand 46 148 194 1331 1988 1.084 0.244 – 1.622 4 2 44
Turkey 12 35 47 40 1988 0.237 0.350 51 (1.518) 4 12 0
Venezuela 4 4 8 288 1996 0.120 0.067 40 (2.921) 2 3 1
Total Median Total
686 1418 2104 13,821 1990 0.310 0.321 54.5 0.473 4 476 210
The table reports summary statistics of the sample by country. Investable dates are taken from the Emerging Markets Database (EMDB). # Obs is the number of firm-year observations; # I is the number of investable
firms; # NI is the number of non-investable firms, and # Total is the total number of firms. “First Invest” is the first year in which investable firms enter the sample. “Invest & SC” and “Invest & DC” refers to the
number of single- and dual-class share investable firms. Financial development indicators are sourced from the World Bank. DCPS is credit provided to the private sector in the country (as a % of GDP), and MCAP
is market capitalization of listed firms in the country (as a % of GDP). ACC is accounting standards, which is a measure provided by the Center for International Financial Analysis and Research (CIFAR) (sourced
from La Porta et al. (1998)). The index ranges from 1 to 100, with low scores indicating poor accounting standards. Country governance (GOV) is a measure of country governance, and is sourced from Kaufmann
et al. (2007). Country governance is calculated by averaging over the years 1996, 1998, and 2000. It is the sum of voice & accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law,
and control of corruption. SR is shareholder rights, and is Spamann’s (2010) “corrected” anti-director rights index. Where the Spamann (2010) “corrected” anti-director rights index is not available (i.e. China, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Poland, Russia, and Sri Lanka), I use the revised version of the anti-director rights index created by Djankov et al. (2008). Low values of country governance and shareholder rights
reflect poor governance and weak shareholder rights, respectively.
6 T. O’Connor / Review of Development Finance 3 (2013) 1–12
Table 2
Univariate comparisons.
Measure of excess growth Comparison of means
Before After Difference
Excess growth calculated using sales growth
Excess SG (0.001) (0.003) (0.002)
Excess SFG 0.028 0.025 (0.003)
Excess growth calculated using asset growth
Excess SG (0.001) 0.001 0.002
Excess SFG 0.030 0.029 (0.001)
Measure of excess growth Comparison of medians
Before After Difference
Excess growth calculated using sales growth
Excess SG (0.048) (0.045) 0.003
Excess SFG (0.026) (0.027) (0.001)
Excess growth calculated using asset growth
Excess SG (0.031) (0.023) 0.008
Excess SFG (0.027) (0.019) 0.008
Measure of excess growth Comparison of proportions
Before After Difference
Excess growth calculated using sales growth
Excess SG 0.28 0.17 (0.11)***
Excess SFG 0.31 0.15 (0.16)***
Excess growth calculated using asset growth
Excess SG 0.31 0.19 (0.12)***
Excess SFG 0.33 0.16 (0.17)***
In this table I report the mean and median excess growth rate for investable firms before and after they first become investable. In the bottom rows, I also report the
proportion of firms in each country whose actual sales (or asset) growth rate exceeds either their predicted short-term financed growth rate (SFG) or their predicted
sustainable growth rate (SG). Excess growth is either Excess SG or Excess SFG. Excess SG is a firm’s actual sales or asset growth rate (as indicated) which exceeds
its predicted sustainable growth rate (SG). The predicted sustainable growth rate (SG) is calculated as (ROE/(1 − ROE)) where ROE is the return on equity. Excess
SFG is a firm’s actual sales or asset growth rate (as indicated) which exceeds its predicted short-term financed growth rate (SFG). For each firm, SFG is calculated as
(ROLTC/(1 − ROLTC)) where ROLTC is the ratio of earnings after interest and tax to long-term capital. Long-term capital denotes the assets of a firm not financed
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level financing constraints, respectively. I do so since the
analysis performed in Table 3 is likely to mask the differential
effect that investability is likely to have across firms.15 Financialy short-term debt, and is calculated as the product of a firm’s total assets and 1
** Statistical significance at the 10% level.
nancing once they become investable.11 In summary, my find-
ngs, when added to theirs, suggest that investable firms use
ess equity financing once they become investable, resulting in
decrease in externally-financed growth rates.12 Collectively,
hese findings lend support to the notion that investable firms
re mature firms, and as a result have little need for exter-
al finance. Their post-investable growth (see Mitton, 2006) is
nanced mostly using internal funds (this paper).
The coefficient estimates on the firm-level control variables
uggest that externally-financed growth rates are smaller for
ividend paying, profitable firms, and firms with a reliance on
ong-term debt financing. In contrast, and contrary to expecta-
ions, large firms have higher externally financed growth rates.
11 Chari and Henry (2008) document no significant change in external financing
sing a country-level indicator of equity market liberalizations.
12 The evidence is mixed in relation to the relationship between equity market
iberalizations and debt issuance. McLean et al. (2011) document a significant
ncrease in net debt issuance; Flavin and O’Connor (2010) document a decrease.
gca et al. (2007) also document a decrease using leverage ratios (debt to assets).
y findings suggest that irrespective of the relationship, there is no increase in
xternally-financed growth rates (using either long-term debt or equity).
v
t
q
o
O
s
O
is the ratio of short-term liabilities to total assets.
hurana et al. (2008) finds the same. The coefficient estimates
n the remaining two control variables (NFA/TA) and (NS/NFA)
witch sign depending on whether I measure external financing
rowth using sales or asset growth.13
In Table 4, I estimate Eqs. (4a) and (4b) by financial
evelopment, country shareholder rights, country governance,
ountry accounting standards, corporate governance and firm-
1413 Khurana et al. (2008) also document sign changes for some of their control
ariables, depending on the regression specification employed.
14 In Tables 4 and 5, I report only the coefficient estimates using Excess SG as
he dependent variable (calculated using sales growth). The conclusions remain
ualitatively unchanged when I use either Excess SFG (calculated using sales
r asset growth) or Excess SG (calculated using asset growth).
15 Studies closely related to this one suggest that this is the case. Mitton and
’Connor (2012) show that the “investable premium” is larger for firms with
izable pre-investable financing constraints. Both Bae and Goyal (2010) and
’Connor (2012) attribute the greatest value gains from equity market liberal-
zations to better-governed firms.
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Table 3
Regression estimates of the impact of investability on externally-financed growth rates.
Dependent variable is Excess SG Dependent variable is Excess SFG
Using sales growth Using asset growth Using sales growth Using asset growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
INVESTABLE −0.049***
(3.11)
−0.100***
(6.62)
−0.051***
(3.75)
−0.109***
(8.18)
−0.047***
(3.26)
−0.112***
(7.68)
−0.050***
(3.87)
−0.122***
(9.11)
DIV/TA −2.110***
(5.75)
−1.656***
(4.84)
−2.049***
(7.00)
−1.428***
(5.28)
−1.533***
(5.96)
−0.864***
(3.44)
−1.429***
(7.18)
−0.596***
(2.91)
EBIT/NS −0.417***
(8.70)
−0.360***
(7.84)
−0.358***
(10.68)
−0.273***
(8.39)
−0.168***
(4.06)
−0.082**
(2.04)
−0.104***
(3.92)
0.010
(0.33)
NS/NFA 0.021***
(4.47)
0.023***
(4.56)
−0.033***
(7.42)
−0.031***
(7.16)
0.036***
(7.94)
0.039***
(7.61)
−0.019***
(4.93)
−0.016***
(3.99)
SIZE 0.189***
(12.84)
0.144***
(11.04)
0.219***
(15.86)
0.152***
(12.46)
0.224***
(16.25)
0.159***
(12.41)
0.256***
(18.94)
0.170***
(13.85)
LTD/TA 0.010
(0.09)
−0.034
(0.54)
−0.011
(0.21)
−0.042
(0.78)
−0.087*
(1.67)
−0.149***
(2.73)
−0.114***
(2.56)
−0.168***
(3.51)
NFA/TA 0.192***
(2.94)
0.175***
(2.68)
−0.122**
(2.16)
−0.155***
(2.71)
0.122**
(2.20)
0.094
(1.61)
−0.219***
(4.45)
−0.264***
(4.87)
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No
# Obs 13,821 13,821 13,821 13,821 13,821 13,821 13,821 13,821
R-squared 0.033 0.027 0.048 0.049 0.025 0.010 0.034 0.017
This table reports coefficient estimates from firm-fixed effects regressions with t-statistics (absolute value) reported in parentheses. The t-statistics are calculated
using standard errors clustered at the firm level. INVESTABLE is a dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is designated as investable.
The dependent variable is Excess SG or Excess SFG, as indicated. Excess SG is a firm’s actual sales or asset growth rate (as indicated) which exceeds its predicted
sustainable growth rate (SG). The predicted sustainable growth rate (SG) is calculated as (ROE/(1 − ROE)) where ROE is the return on equity. Excess SFG is
a firm’s actual sales or asset growth rate (as indicated) which exceeds its predicted short-term financed growth rate (SFG). For each firm, SFG is calculated as
(ROLTC/(1 − ROLTC)) where ROLTC is the ratio of earnings after interest and tax to long-term capital. Long-term capital denotes the assets of a firm not financed
by short-term debt, and is calculated as the product of a firm’s total assets and 1 minus the ratio of short-term liabilities to total assets. DIV/TA is total dividends
divided by total assets. EBIT/NS is earnings before interest and taxation to net sales. NS/NFA is net sales to net fixed assets. Firm Size [SIZE] is proxied using the
log of assets in real US$. LTD/TA is long-term debt to total assets and NFA/TA is net fixed assets to total assets. A full set of firm and time fixed-effects are included
but not reported. # Obs is the number of firm-year observations. The overall R-squared is reported.
* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
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ector development is either domestic credit to the private sector
as a % of GDP) (DCPS) or market capitalization of listed firms,
lso as a % of GDP (MCAP).16 I use Spamann’s (2010) “cor-
ected” anti-director rights index (using 1997 values) to measure
ountry shareholder rights.17 Country-governance is measured
sing the governance measures of Kaufmann et al. (2007).18
16 Table 1 outlines the financial development, shareholder rights, country gover-
ance and accounting standards measures by country. They suggest that financial
arkets are well-developed in Malaysia, but not so in Venezuela. Shareholders
re well protected in Brazil, Chile, Pakistan and Taiwan, but not so in China.
ortugal (Taiwan) score high using measures of country governance (accounting
tandards).
17 rights is an index that aggregates six different shareholder rights and ranges
n value from 0 to 6 with 6 as the highest level of protection for minority share-
olders. Where the Spamann (2010) “corrected” anti-director rights index is not
vailable (i.e. for China, Czech Republic, Hungary, Indonesia, Poland, Russia,
nd Sri Lanka), I use the revised version of the anti-director rights index created
y Djankov et al. (2008).
18 This measure, available on a semi-annual basis from 1996 to 2000, and on
n annual basis from 2000, is comprised of six components, namely, voice and
ccountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality,
ule of law, and control of corruption. I calculate country governance for each
ountry in my sample, as the sum of each of these six variables in each year,
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Mccounting standards is from CIFAR (Center for International
inancial Analysis & Research), which I source from La Porta
t al. (1998).19 To measure the strength of corporate governance,
use an indicator variable that takes the value of one if the firm
s a dual-class share firm (DC), and zero for a single-class share
rm (SC).20 To classify firms as either SC or DC, I employ the
Currently a Multiple Share Company’ variable from World-
cope. It identifies multiple share companies as “. . .companies
hich currently have more than one type of common/ordinary
nd averaged over the years 1996, 1998, and 2000, in order to coincide with the
ample period in this paper.
19 The index of accounting standards is measured in 1995 and is created by
xamining and rating companies’ annual reports for their inclusion and exclusion
f 85 items and ranges from 0 to 100 with 100 as the highest accounting standard.
20 Durnev and Kim (2005, 2007) show using CLSA and S&P corporate gov-
rnance data that in firms where control rights exceed cashflow rights (e.g.
ual-class share firms), corporate governance standards tend to be lower in these
rms, relative to firms where no such differences (or much smaller differences)
xist between control and cashflow rights (e.g. single-class share firms). Con-
istent with the view, the consumption of private benefits tends to be greater in
rms with dual-class shares compared to firms with single-class share structures
DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 1985; Grossman and Hart, 1988, and more recently,
asulis et al., 2009).
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Table 4
Regression estimates of the impact of investability on externally-financed growth rates.
Domestic creditor to
private sector (DCPS)
Market capitalization (MCAP) Shareholder rights (SR) Country governance (GOV) Accounting standards (ACC) Single & dual-class share firms Dividend payout (DP)
High DCPS Low DCPS High MCAP Low MCAP High SR Low SR High GOV Low GOV High ACC Low ACC Single Class Dual Class High DP Low DP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14)
INVESTABLE −0.063***
(3.06)
−0.027
(0.98)
−0.065***
(3.28)
−0.042
(1.41)
−0.044**
(2.46)
−0.090***
(2.69)
−0.066***
(3.39)
0.001
(0.03)
−0.048**
(2.37)
0.010
(0.27)
−0.045**
(2.50)
−0.066**
(2.03)
−0.031
(1.43)
−0.060***
(2.60)
DIV/TA −2.068***
(3.67)
−2.068***
(3.94)
−2.156***
(3.79)
−1.864***
(4.08)
−2.346***
(5.71)
−1.307
(1.50)
−2.129***
(4.20)
−2.187***
(4.41)
−2.402***
(5.08)
−2.169***
(3.01)
−2.211***
(4.55)
−1.978***
(3.58)
−1.683***
(4.26)
−5.715***
(6.42)
EBIT/NS −0.347***
(5.76)
−0.600***
(6.68)
−0.363***
(5.77)
−0.523***
(6.48)
−0.366***
(6.73)
−0.637***
(7.19)
−0.383***
(6.25)
−0.456***
(5.90)
−0.482***
(4.98)
−0.599***
(6.38)
−0.411***
(6.87)
−0.434***
(5.47)
−0.549***
(6.86)
−0.338***
(5.58)
NS/NFA 0.035***
(4.45)
0.002
(0.33)
0.031***
(4.70)
0.004
(0.59)
0.019***
(3.70)
0.034***
(2.66)
0.020***
(3.64)
0.022**
(2.20)
0.026***
(4.10)
−0.010
(0.56)
0.020***
(3.76)
0.029**
(2.42)
0.012**
(2.13)
0.035***
(3.93)
SIZE 0.173***
(8.16)
0.179***
(7.12)
0.202***
(9.94)
0.156***
(6.27)
0.170***
(10.38)
0.288***
(7.86)
0.168***
(9.58)
0.222***
(8.95)
0.250***
(12.10)
0.248***
(6.13)
0.179***
(10.12)
0.206***
(7.74)
0.170***
(8.13)
0.207***
(9.90)
LTD/TA 0.113
(1.32)
−0.177*
(1.95)
0.088
(1.08)
−0.081
(0.82)
0.023
(0.34)
−0.153
(0.98)
0.021
(0.25)
−0.010
(0.09)
−0.058
(0.74)
0.245
(1.33)
0.023
(0.30)
−0.010
(0.10)
0.032
(0.35)
−0.024
(0.29)
NFA/TA 0.196**
(2.20)
0.215**
(2.03)
0.245***
(2.80)
0.091
(0.90)
0.196***
(2.74)
0.283*
(1.78)
0.127
(1.57)
0.323***
(3.11)
0.182**
(1.97)
−0.013
(0.06)
0.209***
(2.63)
0.163
(1.43)
0.208**
(2.16)
0.170*
(1.87)
Firm dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
# Obs 7659 4564 8496 4428 11,293 2528 8965 4856 6154 2043 9604 4217 6909 6912
R-squared 0.051 0.031 0.042 0.024 0.047 0.010 0.028 0.050 0.022 0.101 0.039 0.027 0.033 0.014
This table reports coefficient estimates from firm-fixed effects regressions with t-statistics (absolute value) reported in parentheses. Separate regressions are reported for firms in countries with high (above-median) or
low (below-median) financial development (DCPS & MCAP), shareholder rights (SR), country governance (GOV), accounting standards (ACC), for single and dual class firms, and for firms with high (above-median)
and low (below-median) dividend payout (DP). All of these measures are defined in the main text. The t-statistics are calculated using standard errors clustered at the firm level. INVESTABLE is a dummy variable
that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is designated as investable. The dependent variables is Excess SG. Excess SG is a firm’s actual sales growth rate which exceeds its predicted sustainable growth rate
(SG). The predicted sustainable growth rate (SG) is calculated as (ROE/(1 − ROE)) where ROE is the return on equity. A full set of firm and time fixed-effects are included but not reported. # Obs is the number of
firm-year observations. The overall R-squared is reported.
* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
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negative and statistically significant. For firms that are gen-
uinely available to foreign investors, externally-financed growth
decreases once they become investable.28T. O’Connor / Review of Dev
hare.” Of the total number of investable firms (see Table 1), 476
re single-class share firms, and the remaining 210 are dual-class
hare firms. All 89 Korean investable firms are single-class share
rms. Brazil (35) provides the greatest number of dual-class
nvestable firms. I proxy for the severity of financing constraints
sing corporate dividend payouts (see Fazzari et al., 1988). I
easure dividend payouts as dividends to assets.21 Investable
rms are financially constrained (in the pre-investable period),
f their dividend payout is below the sample median dividend
ayout.
The coefficient estimates outlined in Table 4 by finan-
ial development, shareholder rights, country governance, and
ccounting standards, suggest, as before, that stock market lib-
ralizations is not associated with an increase in firm-level
xternally-financed growth rates. The tests by corporate gov-
rnance will shed further light on the underlying sources of
he “investable premia” documented by Mitton and O’Connor
2012) and O’Connor (2012). The former uncover an “investable
remium” in the region of 9% for investable firms, and the lat-
er show the premium is largest for single-class share firms.
f reduced financing constraints explain at least part of the
investable premium”, then I would expect β1 to be positive and
tatistically significant for both, but greater for single-class share
rms. If β1 is not positive, this would then suggest the under-
ying sources of the “investable premium” lie elsewhere, and is
ikely a result of improvements in a firm’s corporate governance
ractices (see Bae et al., 2006).
The coefficient estimates suggests that neither dual nor
ingle class share firms experience an increase in externally-
nanced growth once they become investable. These findings
uggest the “investable premium” is likely the result of, among
ther, an improvement in corporate governance, in part presum-
bly arising from greater participation by foreign institutional
nvestors.22
Finally, I reach similar conclusions when I classify firms
y financing constraints. For both sets of firms, the coefficient
stimates on the investable dummy are statistically negative.
n fact, if anything, the bottom panel suggests that financially-
onstrained firms (firms with below-median dividend payout),
nd those firms with potentially the most to gain from becoming
nvestable rely even less on external financing once they become
nvestable. For these firms, the promise of reduced financing
onstraints from becoming investable fails to materialize.23
21 I use dividends to assets and not dividends to earnings or dividends to
ashflow because the sample sizes using either earnings or cashflow are smaller.
22 Consistent with this view, Bae et al. (2006) document an improvement in
firm’s information environment post-liberalization. Aggarwal et al. (2011)
nd Ferreira and Matos (2008) highlight the role played by foreign institutional
nvestors in improving corporate governance.
23 Mitton and O’Connor (2012) find no “investable premium” for financially-
onstrained and unconstrained firms when they use dividend payouts to proxy for
nancing constraints. When they use investment-cashflow sensitivities to gauge
he extent of financing constraints, they do find a large “investable premium” for
nancially-constrained firms. I do not have access to data which would allow
e to estimate investment-cashflow sensitivities. Thus, I am unable to perform
similar exercise to theirs.
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. Robustness
In this section I examine whether my findings are robust to (1)
he inclusion of extra firm-level control variables; (2) the exclu-
ion of closely-held investable firms, and (3) a longer sample
post-investable) period. In the top panel of Table 5, I estimate
qs. (4a) and (4b) with the inclusion of two additional firm-level
ontrol variables, namely Tobin’s q (TOBIN’S Q) and share
urnover (TURNOVER).24 Both should be positively related to
easures of externally-financed growth, since higher marginal
’s imply higher growth opportunities, and the costs of issu-
ng equity are higher for illiquid stocks. Further, both are most
ikely correlated with the investable dummy, since firms that
ecome investable are worth more, and are traded more than
heir noninvestable counterparts, before becoming investable.25
herefore the exclusion of these two variables may serve to bias
he coefficient estimate on the investable dummy. I find that both
re positively related to externally-financed growth rates. More
mportant, given their inclusion, the coefficient estimates on the
nvestable variable remains negative and statistically insignifi-
ant without exception. My findings appear notto be driven by
mitting these two relevant firm-level control variables.26
Next, I attempt to address concerns that investable firms
ay not be truly investable (i.e. available to foreign investors)
ecause of a small free-float. Firms that are closely-held, maybe
nvestable, and thus available to foreign investors in name only,
ince the number of shares available to foreign owners is small.
onsequently, what I may in fact be finding in this paper is that a
rm dpes not experinence a significiant change in external finan-
ing once they become investable, not by choice, but because
inimal free-floats prevent foreign investors from investing in
his firm in the first instance. To address this concern, I estimate
or each investable firm, their median closely-held shares (as a
of total shares outstanding) over the full sample period, and
ank from highest to lowest. I remove the top 25th percentile of
rms (i.e. those investable firms most closely-held), and proceed
o estimate Eqs. (4a) and (4b) for the remaining investable firms
and all noninvestable firms).27 The coefficient estimates remain24 Tobin’s q is measured as the book value of debt plus market capitalization
ivided by the book value of assets. Market value of debt is proxied using its
ook value counterpart, and the replacement cost of assets as the book value of
ssets. Book value of debt is calculated as the book value of total assets less the
ook value of equity. Turnover is total shares traded in each year divided by the
otal number of shares outstanding at the end of the year.
25 For example, both Mitton and O’Connor (2012) and O’Connor (2012) show
hat investable firms are worth more than non-investable firms even prior to
ecoming investable. Furthermore, the IFC designate firms as investable based
n a number of criteria, one being shares traded (liquidity).
26 When I include these two additional control variables, the number of firm-
ear observations drops to 12,539.
27 For the remaining investable firms, the median number of shares closely held
as a % of total shares outstanding) is 48.94 with a standard deviation of 21.98.
28 Note that the closely-held shares measure is not available for all investable
rms, and as a result the number of firm-year observations falls to 8238.
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Table 5
Robustness.
(1) (2)
Regression estimates with TOBIN’S Q & TURNOVER included
INVESTABLE −0.054***
(3.30)
−0.091***
(5.70)
TOBIN’S Q 0.012**
(2.23)
0.024***
(4.98)
TURNOVER 0.016***
(2.99)
0.010*
(1.75)
DIV/TA −2.020***
(5.32)
−1.654***
(4.64)
EBIT/NS −0.381***
(7.71)
−0.343***
(7.10)
NS/NFA 0.029***
(4.90)
0.030***
(4.95)
SIZE 0.190***
(12.03)
0.158***
(10.75)
LTD/TA 0.031
(0.47)
−0.019
(0.28)
NFA/TA 0.197***
(2.82)
0.176**
(2.51)
Firm dummies Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes No
# Obs 12,539 12,539
R-squared 0.034 0.023
Regression estimates for investable firms with median closely-held shares (%) less than the 75th percentile
INVESTABLE −0.064***
(2.66)
−0.146***
(6.62)
Firm dummies Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes No
Controls Yes Yes
# Obs 8238 8238
# Invest 227 227
R-squared 0.042 0.031
Regression estimates over an extended post-investable period
INVESTABLE −0.112
(1.23)
−0.179*
(1.76)
Firm dummies Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes No
Controls Yes Yes
# Obs 55,805 55,805
R-squared 0.041 0.037
This table reports coefficient estimates from firm-fixed effects regressions with t-statistics (absolute value) reported in parentheses. The t-statistics are calculated
using standard errors clustered at the firm level. INVESTABLE is a dummy variable that is set equal to one in years in which the firm is designated as investable.
The dependent variables is Excess SG. Excess SG is a firm’s actual sales or asset growth rate (as indicated) which exceeds its predicted sustainable growth rate (SG).
The predicted sustainable growth rate (SG) is calculated as (ROE/(1 − ROE)) where ROE is the return on equity. TOBIN’S Q is the book value of debt plus market
capitalization divided by the book value of assets. Market value of debt is proxied using its book value counterpart, and the replacement cost of assets as the book
value of assets. Book value of debt is calculated as the book value of total assets less the book value of equity. TURNOVER is total shares traded in each year divided
by the total number of shares outstanding at the end of the year. All other variables are defined in the main text. A full set of firm and time fixed-effects are included
but not reported. # Obs is the number of firm-year observations. The overall R-squared is reported.
* Statistical significance at the 10% level.
** Statistical significance at the 5% level.
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level.
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Finally, in the bottom rows of Table 5, I extend the sam-
le (investable) periodto alleviate concerns that my findings are
ore a reflection of market segmentation, which may mani-
est at least in the early years of my sample period. To address
his concern, I estimate Eqs. (4a) and (4b) but now over the
xtended period from 1980 to 2007.29 Using this longer sample
eriod, which incorporates more recent years in which market
egmentation is less likely to be of real concern, the coefficient
stimates on the investable variable remain negative and statisti-
ally significant.30 Therefore, even when I allow for an extended
nvestable period, a period in which equity markets are more
ntegrated, external financing continues to contribute less to firm
rowth.31
. Concluding remarks
In this paper I document results which are consistent with
ecent evidence which suggests that investable firms use less,
nd not more, external-financing once they become investable.
lavin and O’Connor (2010) and McLean et al. (2011) exam-
ne the post-investable external capital issuance behavior of
nvestable firms, and find there is a decrease in the issuance
f equity capital, while the evidence on debt issuance is mixed.
n this paper, I examine this issue further, but adopt a differ-
nt approach. Specifically, I examine the contribution made by
xternal-financing to the performance of investable firms by
xamining how their externally-financed growth rates change
nce they become investable.
To do so, I calculate the difference between firms’ actual and
redicted growth rate using the constrained or predicted growth
ates of Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). The difference
etween a firm’s actual and predicted growth rate is a measure of
he extent of a firm’s external-financing activity. If equity market
iberalizations result in a relaxation of financing constraints, then
his difference should increase, once a firm becomes investable.
his is not what I find.
My findings are in line with both Flavin and O’Connor (2010)
nd McLean et al. (2011). I find that investable firms experience
decline in their externally-financed growth rates once they
ecome investable. When I further divide my original sample
sing measures of financial development, country institutional
evelopment, firm-level financing constraints, and corporate
overnance, I uncover no evidence which suggests that equity
arket liberalizations result in a reduction in financing con-
traints, and ultimately increases in externally-financed growth
ates. While I and others can only speculate why this occurs,
hat these findings do suggest is the gains from becoming
29 It is important to note here that I do not have access to the investable dummies
eyond the year 2000. Thus, from the year 2001onwards there are not additional
nvestable firms, and I further assume that those firms that were investable in
000 remain so until 2007.
30 The number of firm-year observations now rises to 55,805.
31 This finding is consistent with the findings of McLean et al. (2011) who
how that investable firms issue less external capital up to and including the year
008.
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nvestable are not the result of reduced financing constraints,
ut most likely from improvements in corporate governance.
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